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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
crimes, but to speak of unnecessary analogies in the face of
distinct differences is a dangerous practice.
What, then, are the differences which exist between the
plea of double jeopardy, and the plea of autrefois convict
or acquit? A review of the cases cited leads to the following conclusions:-1. The plea of double jeopardy originates from Constitutional provisions, while autrefois pleas
find their source in the common law.
2. The plea of double jeopardy is only available in
capital cases, while autrefois pleas are accessible under indictment for any crime.
3. Autrefois pleas require that there shall have been
a verdict, an accepted plea of guilty, or a discharge of the
jury without reasonable necessity. The plea of double
jeopardy is available though no verdict has been given, if
there was discharge of the jury without absolute necessity.
E. F. Hann, Jr.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
CONSIDERATION
The recent case of Langer v. Superior Steel Corporation" presents the question of promissory estoppel in Pennsylvania as a substitute for consideration.
The defendant sent the plaintiff the following letter:
"Aug., 31, 1927.
"Mr. Win. F. Langer,
"Dear Sir:
"As you are retiring from active duty with this company, as superintendent of the Annealing Department, on
August 31, we hope that it will give you some pleasure to
receive this official letter of commendation for your long and
faithful service with the Superior Steel Corporation.
1161 At. 571 (1932).
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"The Directors have decided that you will receive a
pension of $100 per month as long as you live and preserve
your present attitude of loyalty to the company and its officers and are not employed in any competitive occupation.
We sincerely hope that you will live long to enjoy it and
that this and the other evidences of the esteem in which
you are held by your fellow employees and which you will
to-day receive with this letter, will please you as much as
it does us to bestow them.
"Cordially yours,
"(signed) Frank R. Frost,
"President."
The defendant paid the $100 per month for about four
years and then refused to pay any longer.
The Superior Court, after holding that there was sufficient consideration to support the promise, said, "This
contract is enforceable also on the theory of promissory
estoppel."
To support its holding the Court quotes section 90 of
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts which states "a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
' 2
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Before discussing promissory estoppel we should note
the difference existing between it and what is ordinarily
called estoppel or equitable estoppel. In the latter we have
a misrepresentation of fact by one party and a reliance
thereon by the other party to his detriment.3
In the former we have a reliance on a promise to do
something in the future as distinguished from a misrepre4
sentation of a present fact.

When will the courts invoke this doctrine of promis2The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts
p. 138.
321 C. J. 1113.
'Langer v. Superior Steel Co., supra; Williston on Contracts p. 308,
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sory estoppel?
Prof. Williston says, "Promises of future action, it is
generally held, if they can furnish the basis for an estoppel
at all, can do so only where they relate to an intended
abandonment of an existing right and are made to influence
others who are in fact induced to act thereby." 5
Our Supreme Court followed this doctrine in the case of
Stayton v. Graham" where the court said, "The doctrine of
estoppel is applied to prevent statements of intended abandonment of existing rights from operating as a fraud upon a
party who has been led to rely on them and thereby change
his conduct and alter his condition."
Perhaps the most usual example of this intended abandonment of an existing legal right is where a party owing
a debt promises his creditors that he will not plead the
statute of limitations if the creditors do not sue until after
the statute has run. The courts will hold that the debtor is
7
estopped to plead the statute.
Another situation in which the courts have invoked this
doctrine is where there was a gratuitous oral license and the
licensee made improvements and expended money in reliance thereon. The leading Pennsylvania case on this
point is Rerick v. Kern.8 In that case Kern applied to Rerick for'permission to divert a stream and the permission
was granted. Kern in reliance on the license diverted the
stream and built a saw mill on the stream. Rerick brought
a special action on the case for diverting the stream. The
court held that although the license was revocable in the
beginning it became irrevocable when Kern made expenditures on the faith of it.
The holding of Rerick v. Kern has been followed
through a long line of Pennsylvania cases and is undoubted5

Williston on Contracts p. 309.
6139 Pa. 1 (1891).
7Armstrong v. Levan, 109 Pa. 177 (1885); Williston on Contracts
p. 309.
814 Serg. & R. 267 (1826).
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ly the law today.9
The idea of a revocable license becoming irrevocable
upon an expenditure of money in reliance thereon has been
extended to other fields. For instance in the case of
Bassick Manufacturing Co. v. Riley ° the court recognized
the fact that a gratuitous license to use one's name in a business enterprise may become irrevocable when the licensee
expends money in reliance on the right to use the licensor's
name.
Promissory estoppel has also been applied in the case
of a parol promise to give land when there has been a taking of possession and making of valuable improvements on
the land in reliance on the promise to convey.-" In speaking of this type of a promise, Prof. Walsh says that the
alleged donor is, "estopped from denying the validity of a
parol gift or promise to make a gift." 1 2

In this type of case,

however, the only kind of reliance that is sufficient to work
an estoppel is, (1) the taking of possession and (2) making
improvements on the land. There must be both as either
one alone is not sufficient. 1"
In a recent case 14 where there was a parol promise to
give land followed by a taking of possession and making
improvements the court held that it was a promise reasonably inducing definite and substantial action which would
result in injustice if it were not enforced. In support of
their holding the court quotes section 90 of the Restatement.
Prof. Williston says in his work on Contracts that contracts of marriage settlement are to be supported by promissory estoppel."
9

Baldwin v. Taylor, 166 Pa. 507 (1895); Willis v. Railway Co.,
188 Pa. 56 (1898); Harris v. Brown, 202 Pa. 16 (1902); Bishop v.
Buckley, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 123 (1907); Leininger v. Goodman, 277 Pa.
75 (1923).
109 Fed. (2nd.) 138 (1925).
"Williston on Contracts p. 312; Neale v. Neale, 76 U. S. 1 (1869).
lIWalsh on Equity p. 407; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence p. 904.
"Walsh on Equity p. 408.
14Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759 (1930); See comment in 15 Minn. L. Rev. 825.

loWilliston on Contracts p. 312.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In deciding whether or not such a contract was enforceable Cardozo, J. said that it was a unilateral contract
and that the entering into the marriage was the consideration for the promise.15a
Subscriptions to charities constitute another class of
cases that has been supported on the theory of promissory
estoppel. 16 Several theories have been advanced as the
basis for supporting such subscriptions,17 but the best one
is that of promissory estoppel' and this seems to be the
theory followed in Pennsylvania.19
In a recent New York case2 ° a divided court upheld a
subscription to Allegheny College. Cardozo, J. in giving
the opinion for the majority of the court said,
"There has grown up of recent days a doctrine that
a substitute for consideration or an exception to its
ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled
a promissory estoppel.'
"Whether this exception has made its way in this
state to such an extent as to permit us to say that the
general law of consideration has been modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to say. Certain at least,
it is, that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions."
The other view is intimated by Kellogg, J. in the dissenting opinion when he says,
"In order to make a bargain it is necessary that
the acceptor shall give in return for the offeror's
promise exactly the consideration which the offeror requests."
b5aDe Cicco v. Schweizer (N. Y.) 117 N. E. 807 (1917); See also
article by Prof. Corbin in "Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts,""
p. 504.
16Ryerss v. Trustees, 33 Pa. 114 (1859); Reimensnyder, Adm. v.
Cans, 110 Pa, 17 (1885); University of Pa. v. Coxe's Exers., 277 Pa.
512 (1923).
17See Horan v. Keane, 204 N. W. 546, (Minn,1925).
2SWilliston on Contracts p. 252.
'9See cases cited in note 16 supra.
20
Allegheny College v. Bank, 246 N. Y, 369, 159 N. E. 173, 57 A.
L. R. 980 (1927).
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Justice Holmes stated this view in French v. Boston,

Nat. Bank21 when he said,
"Reliance upon a promise gives it no new validity
when such reliance is not the conventional inducement
of the promise, that is to say, when it is not contemplated by the terms of the bargain as the equivalent of
the promise."
He iterated this doctrine as a member of the Supreme
Court of the United States when he said,
"No matter what the actual motive may have been,
by the express and implied terms of the supposed contract, the promise and the consideration must purport
to be the motive for each other, in whole or at least in
part. It is not enough that the promise induced the
induced the promise, if
detriment, or that the detriment
22
the other half is wanting.."
The doctrine of promissory estoppel threatens to do
away with the idea of a consideration which the offeror requests, so far as it is allowed to apply. It may be used as a
basis for enforcing a promise where no consideration has
been requested at a1123 if there has been a reliance on the
promise by the promisee to his detriment. This endangers
the whole doctrine of consideration which has been so long
a basic element of our law of contracts. The doctrine is a
result of the desire of the courts to relieve against hardships
to those who honestly relied on the promises of others. In
applying the doctrine it would seem that the courts should
bear in mind this reason for its origin and that they should
not extend it to new cases unless a failure to apply it would
result in substantial hardship to the person who relied on
the promise.
George W. Atkins
21179 Mass. 404 (1901).
22Wis. F Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903).
2BRicketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898).

